Book Review of The Second War of Italian Unification, 1859-61

Frederick C. Schneid. The Second War of Italian Unification, 1859-61. Essential Histories series. Botley, England: Osprey, 2012. ISBN 978-1-84908-787-2. Chronology. Illustrations. Maps. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 96. $20.95.

There are too few studies on the four Wars of Italian Unification in the English language.  Dr Frederick C. Schneid, Professor of History at High Point University in North Carolina, is one historian that is attempting to correct this void in historiography.  He provides a concise study of the Second War of Italian Unification (1859-1861) in Osprey’s Essential Histories series.  Schneid is known for Soldiers of Napoleon’s Kingdom of Italy: Army, State, and Society, 1800-1815 (1995), Napoleon’s Italian Campaigns, 1805-1815 (2002), Napoleon’s Conquest of Europe: The War of the Third Coalition (2005), and more recently Napoleonic Wars (2012).  He is also an editor of Warfare in Europe, 1792-1815 (2007), Conscription in the Napoleonic Era: A Revolution in Military Affairs? (2009), European Politics 1815-1848 (2011), and The Projection and Limitations of Imperial Powers, 1618-1850 (2012).

In this study, Schneid discusses Italian politics and the origins of the Wars of Italian Unification from the downfall of Napoleon in 1815, including the First War of Italian Unification (1848-1849), to the outbreak of the second conflict in 1859.  The author examines the Italian kingdoms of Piedmont-Sardinia and the Two Sicilies, France, and Austria, as well as Prime Minister Camillo di Cavour of Piedmont-Sardinia and Napoleon III of France’s secret planning at Plombières (1858) for a war to force Austria out of northern Italy.

Once setting the scene, the author provides detailed coverage of Franco-Piedmontese military operations against Austria in the Second War of Italian Unification.  He divides the war into three phases: the defensive phase (24 April to 12 May), the offensive phase (12 May  to 24 June), and the Armistice of Villafranca (25 June to 11 July 1859).  Schneid depicts the battles of Magenta (4 June), Solferino (24 June), and San Martino (24 June) that led to a truce and then the Preliminary Peace of Villafranca.  This marked the end of the war against Austria, with Piedmont-Sardinia gaining Lombardy from Austria, and France acquiring Nice and Savoy from Piedmont-Sardinia.

At this point, Giuseppe Garibaldi, a revolutionary allied to Piedmont-Sardinia, launched his campaign against the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in 1860.  He vowed to conquer the Two Sicilies for Victor Emmanuel II of Piedmont-Sardinia.  Schneid examines the military operations of Garibaldi against the Two Sicilies, including the battle of Calatafimi (15 May), capture of Palermo (with British intervention), and the battle of Milazzo (19 July) on the island of Sicily.  Garibaldi’s forces then crossed the Straits of Messina and took on the Neapolitan army, while Piedmontese troops crossed into the Papal States, defeating the Papal army at the battle of Castelfidardo (18 September).  The Piedmont army besieged and captured of Ancona (29 September) while Garibaldi narrowly defeated Neapolitan forces at Volturno (1 October).  The Piedmontese army began the siege of the Neapolitan seaport city of Gaeta in November, and finally captured it February 1861.  The Second War of Italian Unification was over — with the King of Piedmont-Sardinia being proclaimed as King Victor Emmanuel I of Italy by the new Italian Parliament.  Italy was united, with the exception of Rome and Venetia.  That would have to wait for the Third and Fourth Wars of Italian Unification (1866, 1870).

This is a valuable, brief study of the Second War of Italian Unification.  It adds to other studies on the conflict, including Patrick Turnbull’s Solferino: The Birth of a Nation (1985), Arnold Blumberg’s A Carefully Planned Accident: The Italian War of 1859 (1990) and Frank Coppa’s The Origins of the Italian Wars of Independence (1992).  It leaves this reviewer anxiously waiting for the promised release of Schneid’s next work, a detailed study of the Wars of the Risorgimento covering the Second War of Italian Unification, planned for publication in 2013.

Dr William Young
University of North Dakota
Grand Forks, North Dakota

Book Review of War and Religion after Westphalia, 1648-1713

David Onnekink, editor. War and Religion after Westphalia, 1648-1713.  Politics and Culture in North-Western Europe 1650-1720 series. Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2009. ISBN 978-0-7546-6129-0. Charts. Figures. Notes. Index. Pp. xvi, 274. $124.95.

Originally published in The Journal of Military History 74 (October 2010): 1272-73.  The review has been updated.

The traditional historical view is that religion played a limited role in European international relations and warfare after the Thirty Years War (1618-1648).  Historians have argued that political and economic interests prevailed over religion as the primary factors in international relations and the causes of conflict after 1648.  Dr David Onnekink, an Assistant Professor of the Early Modern History of International Relations at the University of Utrecht, has edited a collection of essays written by political, military, cultural, and religious historians that challenge, to various degrees, the traditional belief about the small role of religion in European international relations and warfare between the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and Peace of Utrecht (1713).  The essays examine what has been called the “Dark Alliance” between religion and war.  They stress the relationship between war, foreign policy, and religion.

The first four essays investigate the role of religion in the formulation of foreign policy in France, Spain, England, and the Dutch Republic.  Paul Sonnino looks at Louis XIV’s policy in the era of the Dutch War (1672-78).  He points out that religion, despite some religious dissent at home, played little role in the conflict, which included fighting the Protestant powers of the United Provinces and Brandenburg, as well as the Catholic powers of Spain and the Holy Roman Emperor, in the quest to gain the Spanish Netherlands.  But, after the conflict, the Sun King began to rid himself of religious dissention within his borders in the event of a new war.  In his essay, Christopher Storrs argues that Carlos II of Spain (1665-1700) pursued a pragmatic foreign policy allying with Catholic and Protestant powers in the struggle to defend the Spanish Empire against the designs of Louis XIV in Europe.  Even so, religion served a more significant role in the formulation of imperial policy abroad.  Andrew C. Thompson believes that the Protestant interest played an important part in British politics, and religious views influenced foreign policy and the pursuit of a balance of power.  David Onnekink asserts that Dutch foreign policy was swayed by the fear of the perceived Catholic threat of France, England (while James II was on the throne), and the Holy Roman Empire leading up to the outbreak of the Nine Years War (1688-1697).  However, he stresses that the conflict was not fought along religious lines.

Two historians deal with warfare during this period. K.A.J. McLay argues that the perceived role of Providence in battle was being replaced by a growing secular approach to the art of warfare.  He emphasizes the professionalism of operational planning, the structuring of command, and battlefield management in the Nine Years War and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-13). Preparation and skill had more to do with victories and defeats than the favor of Providence during this era.  In the other essay, Matthew Glozier studies French Huguenot refugees that fought in Anglo-Dutch supported invasions of France during the Nine Years War, in attempts to force Louis XIV to rethink the Edict of Fontainebleau (1685) that had taken away the right of Huguenots to practice their religion in France.  The author finds nothing predictable about Huguenot militancy.  Some Huguenots were inspired by their religious beliefs, while others fought as professional soldiers (p. 153).

The remaining essays address an assortment of issues. Jill Stern explores the rhetoric in Dutch political pamphlets from 1648 to 1672, and believes that religion continued to be an important factor in the matters of war and peace.  Stéphane Jettot discusses the role of politics and religion in the activities of three English diplomats at Catholic courts in Spain and France from the 1660s to 1680s.  Stephen Taylor looks at the views of the Englishman Roger Morrice with respect to his Protestant-oriented reporting of European events in the Entring Book, a journal of public affairs, in the 1680s.  Emma Bergin investigates Dutch pamphlets concerning the Glorious Revolution in England (1688-89), concluding that the Dutch public continued to see foreign policy issues in religious terms.  Donald Haks delves into how the Dutch States General employed religious rhetoric to unite their countrymen in defense against Louis XIV from 1672 to 1713.

This interesting collection of essays rekindles the debate over the influence of religion in western European politics and warfare in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The authors vary in terms of their methodology and opinions regarding the impact of religion on foreign policy and warfare.  But, these essays serve to show that religion continued to be a factor in international relations and warfare during this period.

Dr William Young
University of North Dakota
Grand Forks, North Dakota

Book Review of The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661-1701

Guy Rowlands. The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661-1701. Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History series. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2002. ISBN 0-521-64124-1. Maps. Illustrations. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xxiv, 404. $144.00.

Originally published in The Journal of Military History 67 (April 2003): 554.  The review has been updated.

Dr Guy Rowlands, Lecturer at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland, examines the development of Louis XIV’s army and the culture of the royal military establishment from the beginning of the king’s personal rule in 1661 to the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714).  The author argues that the preservation and strengthening of the Bourbon dynasty was the main feature of the Sun King’s reform and buildup of the French military.  Louis XIV sought to possess a monopoly in political and military power, reimpose order on the armed forces, and crush the possibility that the army could be used against him by aristocratic families in any future civil war.  To accomplish this, the Sun King served as his own chief minister.  He also made a complete overhaul of the patronage and clientage system.  Moreover, the king reordered the finances of the realm.  But, to do this successfully, he needed to accommodate the dynastic interests of his leading subjects and the officer corps.

The study is divided into three major parts.  The first part deals with the Le Tellier family and the War Ministry.  Louis XIV elevated the Le Tellier family to the post of Secretary of State for War and gave them a superior political and social status in France.  Michel Le Tellier served in this post beginning in 1643, followed by his son, the Marquis de Louvois, and his grandson, the Marquis de Barbézieux, whose administration ended in 1701.  Rowlands examines the important role played by the Le Tellier family in reforming and building up the French army, their management of the civilian administration of the army, the use of the military treasury system, and the extent of corruption within the civilian administration of the army.  The second part of the book examines the French regimental officer corps, including its administrative structure, career system, patterns of regimental ownership, funding of regiments, and recruitment, as well as cultural and financial pressures on officers to conform to the king’s directions. In the third part, the author investigates the High Command and the role of the leading aristocratic families serving in the army.  He discusses Louis XIV’s selection of generals for command positions, and how the king worked to keep the goodwill and cooperation of these men.  Especially important is Rowlands’s assertion that military commanders possessed more power and influence in the formulation of strategy, field administration, and conduct of operations than previously thought.

This study is a valuable addition to the work on Louis XIV’s army.  It takes issue with some of the arguments set forth in John A. Lynn’s Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army, 1610-1715 (1997).  The work is based on solid archival research in France and Britain.  The study is highly recommended to scholars of the Wars of Louis XIV.

Dr William Young
University of North Dakota
Grand Forks, North Dakota

Book Review of The Thirty Years War: Europe’s Tragedy

Peter H. Wilson. The Thirty Years War: Europe’s Tragedy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009. ISBN 978-0-674-03634-5. Maps. Battle plans. Illustrations. Tables. Notes. Index. Pp. xxii, 997. $35.00.

Originally published in The Journal of Military History 74 (July 2010): 915-16.  The review has been updated.

Writing a history of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) presents the historian with many problems because of the complexity of the conflict.  Major stumbling blocks to the study of the war include the need to work with at least fourteen languages, study thousands of published works, and toil in numerous archives to produce a study that would cover all aspects of a conflict that involved much of Europe.  As such, there are few full-length general accounts of the Thirty Years War. Most of the published literature is meant for specialists, and many of the brief overviews are geared for students.

Dr Peter H. Wilson, Professor of History at the University of Hull, and a leading historian of Early Modern Germany, has taken up this task, and given us the first general account of the conflict since Geoffrey Parker’s The Thirty Years War (1984).  Wilson’s previous studies include War, State and Society in Württemberg, 1677-1793 (1995), German Armies: War and German Society, 1648-1806 (1998), The Holy Roman Empire, 1495-1806 (1999), From Reich to Revolution: German History 1558-1806 (2004), as well as a recently published document  collection The Thirty Years War: A Sourcebook (2010).

Wilson’s massive detailed account, based on the latest research, examines the political, economic, social, and military history of the era with respect to the origins, conduct, and outcome of the most destructive war of the seventeenth century.  The author sees the Thirty Years War as a conflict in Central Europe, and this region is his main focus. But, the study addresses all of the major and minor players, including Spain, France, the Dutch Republic, Sweden, Denmark, England, Transylvania, Savoy, and the Ottoman Empire, that had an impact on the origins or course of the conflict. The author strives to show the distinctiveness of the “German War” in respect to other related conflicts, such as the Hispano-Dutch, Polish-Swedish, and Mantuan wars, during the era.

Wilson begins by examining the origins of the conflict in the Holy Roman Empire in relation to the general European situation in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. To do so, he introduces key issues and participants inside and outside the Empire. The weakened state of the Austrian Habsburgs after the Long Turkish War (1593-1606), the roles of the Protestant Union and Catholic League in German politics, and legal issues such as the Jülich-Cleves Crises are fully examined.  Readers of this journal will appreciate the influence of the Dutch Revolt (1568-1609) and Long Turkish War on military leaders with regard to strategy, military technology, fighting tactics, and logistics in the Thirty Years War.

The author devotes nearly five hundred pages to the conduct of the Thirty Years War. He fully describes the politics, diplomacy, and military action of the many participants involved in the war from the Bohemian Revolt to the Peace of Westphalia.  He argues throughout his study that the Thirty Years War was a series of secular conflicts with religious overtones. The Bohemian Revolt of 1618 was a coup carried out by a minority of anxious militant Protestants against Habsburg rule for political reasons (pp. 269-70). Emperor Ferdinand II drew the support of Maximilian of Bavaria, the Catholic League, and Spain against Frederick V of the Palatinate and the Bohemian rebels, not for religious motives, but to uphold the imperial constitution (p. 297). The dynastic ambitions of Christian IV of Denmark, not a religious cause, led to the Danish phase of the Thirty Years War in 1625 (p. 387). Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden intervened in German affairs for security reasons in 1630 (p.462). Protestant Sweden and Catholic France became allies against the Austrian Habsburgs for secular goals. Most studies of the Thirty Years War give limited coverage to the period after 1635. Historians tend to see this period as chaotic and extremely destructive. Wilson, however, devotes equal attention to this period of the conflict. In fact, his book is especially important for the detailed discussion of activities during the last thirteen years of the war.  He stresses that this phase of the war “wreaked havoc, but it also remained firmly controlled and directed. Operations continued to support political objectives as rulers sought to improve their negotiating positions” (p. 624).

Wilson succeeds in providing a well-written, authoritative study of the Thirty Years War. Specialists as well as general readers will gain much from this work. Military historians will enjoy his coverage of the many campaigns.  There are numerous battle plan maps. However, the study lacks an overall map of Central Europe and smaller operational maps dealing with military campaigns.

Dr William Young
University of North Dakota
Grand Forks, North Dakota

Book Review of Scotland and the Thirty Years War, 1618-1648

Steve Murdoch, editor. Scotland and the Thirty Years War, 1618–1648. History of Warfare series. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2001. ISBN 90-04-12086-6. Illustrations. Tables. Figures. Notes. Index. Pp. xvi, 311. $185.00

Originally published in The Journal of Military History 67 (January 2003): 226-27.  The review has been updated.

Dr Steve Murdoch, Professor of History at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland, is known for his work in Scottish diplomatic, military, and maritime history.  He is the author of Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart: A Diplomatic and Military Analysis (2003), Terror of the Seas? Scottish Maritime Warfare, 1513-1713 (2010), as well as editor of Fighting for Identity: Scottish Military Experiences, 1550-1900 (2002), Military Governors and Imperial Frontiers, c.1600-1800: A Study of Scotland and Empires (2003), and the present collection of essays concerning Scottish involvement in the Thirty Years War (1618-1648).  These essays focus on Stuart diplomacy and Scottish military involvement in the conflict.

By the beginning of the war, the Scots had formed a strong connection with Protestant Germany through the Scottish princess, Elizabeth Stuart, daughter of King James VI and I of Great Britain.  Elizabeth was married to Frederick V, the Elector of the Palatinate who became King of Bohemia in opposition to the Holy Roman Emperor in 1619.  Frederick V and Elizabeth were forced to flee Bohemia and the Palatinate after the Battle of White Mountain in 1620.  Thereafter, the Stuart monarchy sought the restoration of Frederick V and Elizabeth to their lands in the Palatinate.  The contributors to this volume emphasize the devotion of Scottish diplomats and soldiers to Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia, and her family’s cause against the Habsburgs.

The Scots played a key role in Stuart diplomacy during the war.  In his essay, Steve Murdoch stresses the Stuart monarchy’s reliance upon Scotsmen to conduct British diplomacy at the Danish and Swedish courts in support of Frederick V.  These efforts led to alliances against the Habsburgs.  On the other hand, David Worthington investigates the activities of Scottish exiles at the courts of the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs.  He argues that these Catholic Scotsmen were loyal to the House of Stuart and the cause of Elizabeth Stuart, despite her Protestant ways. John R. Young looks at Scottish foreign policy and the attempt to extend the Solemn League and Covenant to the European continent as a defense league for European Protestantism in the 1640s.

The most overwhelming involvement of the Scots in the Thirty Years war was in the military sphere.  Over 50,000 Scots fought on the continent during the conflict.  In his essay, Josef Polišenský shows that several thousand Scottish soldiers were deployed to the Palatinate in support of Frederick V in 1619–1621.  Matthew Glozier focuses on the 15,000 Scottish soldiers serving in the armies of France and the Dutch Republic in the struggle against the Habsburgs.  Alexia Grosjean depicts the strong Scottish leadership role and the importance of the 25,000 Scots that served in the Swedish army in the anti-Habsburg war effort.  Finally, Paul Dukes and Robert Frost address the Scottish forces serving in the armies of Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania.

These essays contribute significantly to our knowledge of Scottish military and diplomatic involvement in the Thirty Years War.  The study shows that the Scottish contribution to the conflict was more significant than previously believed.  The study also makes a valuable contribution to the growing knowledge of warfare during the first half of the seventeenth century.

Dr William Young
University of North Dakota
Grand Forks, North Dakota

Book Review of Wallenstein: The Enigma of the Thirty Years War

Geoff Mortimer. Wallenstein: The Enigma of the Thirty Years War. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. ISBN 978-0-230-27213-2. Maps. Plans. Plates. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xi, 277. $100.00.

Originally posted in Military History (10 August 2012)

Albrecht von Wallenstein (1583-1634), a minor Bohemian nobleman, was a military entrepreneur that rose to become one of the most powerful men in central Europe, one of the greatest landowners, and a prince.  He twice raised, financed, and led massive armies to save Emperor Ferdinand II from defeat in the Thirty Years War (1618-1648).  Dr Geoff Mortimer expertly explores the life and military leadership of Wallenstein in this study.  He notes that previous studies in the English language by John Mitchell, The Life of Wallenstein, Duke of Friedland (1837), Francis Watson, Wallenstein: Soldier under the Sun (1938), and Golo Mann, Wallenstein: His Life Narrated (1971, translated into English in 1976) continued to propagate many myths about the man who was assassinated by imperial soldiers after he became too powerful in the Holy Roman Empire during the Thirty Years War.  Mortimer’s previous works include Eyewitness Accounts of the Thirty Years War 1618-48 (2002) and (as editor) Early Modern Military History, 1450-1815 (2004).

At the outbreak of the Bohemian revolt, that began the Thirty Years War, Wallenstein took the side of the Austrian Habsburgs and the Catholics against the Bohemian Protestant rebels, led by Elector Frederick V of the Rhine Palatinate.  He raised a regiment of troops and fought in the wars against Count Ernst von Mansfeld and Bethlan Gabor, Prince of Transylvania, in Moravia.  After the Imperial victory at the Battle of White Mountain (1620), Wallenstein regained his lands that had been lost to the Protestant rebels in Bohemia, and then secured additional lands that had  belonged to his mother’s family as well as confiscated lands that had belonged to Protestant rebels.  He gradually grouped his estates into what was called Friedland in northern Bohemia.  After additional military successes Wallenstein became a prince and then Duke of Friedland in 1625.

Wallenstein supported Emperor Ferdinand II (1619-1637) by raising an army to support the Austrian Habsburgs.  His continual military success led to his ability to purchase additional lands in Bohemia.  He used his vast wealth to provide loans to Ferdinand II who repaid those loans with more lands and titles.  In 1626, Wallenstein defeated Mansfeld at the Battle of Dessau Bridge.  He then joined the Count of Tilly in the war against Christian IV of Denmark, and later gained as a reward the Duchy of Mecklenburg.  He attempted to build an imperial naval fleet to challenge the Northern Powers.  But he failed to capture Stralsund (1628) which denied him access to the Baltic Sea.  Even so, Wallenstein defeated Christian IV at the Battle of Wolgast in the Duchy of Pomerania, forcing the Danish king to agree to the Peace of Lübeck (1629).

In 1630, King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden joined the Thirty Years War by invading northern Germany.  Meanwhile, Ferdinand II, suspecting the power and ambition of his general, dismissed Wallenstein.  Tilly took over Wallenstein’s army.  But, Gustavus Adolphus, financed by France, defeated Tilly at the First Battle of Breitenfeld (1631), and then marched across central Germany.  The Swedes defeated Tilly at the Battle of Rain (1632) and then occupied Bavaria and Bohemia.  Now Ferdinand II needed the ability of Wallenstein to raise an army and defend what was left of the Holy Roman Empire.  Wallenstein raised a new army within a few weeks and took to the field.  He forced the Saxon army, which was allied to Sweden, from Bohemia and then moved against the Swedes and besieged Nuremberg in Bavaria.  Once supplies in the city dwindled, the Swedish king moved out and attacked the fortified Imperial camp in the Battle of Alte Veste (1632).  Wallenstein defeated the Swedes and forced Gustavus Adolphus to retreat to Saxony.  The Swedes, despite the death of Gustavus Adolphus, then defeated Wallenstein’s army in the Battle of Lützen (1632).

In 1632 Wallenstein had slowed down the tide of Swedish victories and kept them from invading and occupying the Habsburg hereditary lands.  But his own losses were substantial.  He had to rebuild his army while avoiding a major battle in 1633.  Wallenstein knew that the Habsburgs needed peace, and therefore he negotiated with the enemy to buy time to rebuild his army and possibly to achieve a peace settlement.  Even so, his enemies in Vienna accused him of avoiding battle and preparing to desert Ferdinand II.  Mortimer discusses Wallenstein’s failed peace negotiations.  He did resume the offensive, and defeated the Swedes and Saxons at the Battle of Steinau (1633) in the recovery of Silesia.  He then moved his army into winter quarters near Pilsen in Bohemia.  In the meantime, Ferdinand II, listening to Wallenstein’s political enemies, sought to rid himself of Wallenstein.  Wallenstein was tried and found guilty in abstentia for his so-called treachery in a secret court.  Thus, the Emperor had him assassinated at Eger in 1634.

Mortimer provides an excellent modern study of Wallenstein.  The author does a good job at trying to get to the bottom of many issues, including Wallenstein’s personality, ambition, organizational talents, and interest in astrology.   He writes that “the problem in distinguishing between fact, exaggeration, and invention is that the tall stories [about Wallenstein’s life] started to appear early in Wallenstein’s public career, no doubt because of the interest which his sudden rise to prominence created.  They were then deliberately publicised, magnified and exploited by his enemies in the later years of his life, so that they were well-established common knowledge by the time of his death” (p.241).  As such, numerous myths grew and continued to influence our view of Wallenstein.   This work is highly recommended for students interested in the Thirty Years War and Early Modern Military History.

Dr William Young
University of North Dakota
Grand Forks, North Dakota

Book Review of Declaring War in Early Modern Europe

Frederic J. Baumgartner. Declaring War in Early Modern Europe. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. ISBN 978-0-230-11412-8. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. vii, 206. $80.00.

Is it necessary for one state to formally declare war against another state?  This is one of the questions that Dr Frederic J. Baumgartner, Professor of History at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, examines in this interesting study.  His purpose is to understand the historical background concerning the theory and practice in the declaration of wars in Early Modern Europe, and its influence on the development and practice of war-making powers in the United States.  The author is well-known for his studies Change and Continuity in the French Episcopate: The Bishops and the Wars of Religion, 1547-1610 (1986),  Henry II: King of France, 1547-1559 (1988), From Spear to Flintlock: A History of War in Europe and the Middle East to the French Revolution (1991),  Louis XII (1994), France in the Sixteenth Century (1995), and Behind Locked Doors: A History of the Papal Elections (2003).

To set up his discussion, Baumgartner begins by examining Greek, Roman, and medieval precedents concerning the declaration of war in Early Modern Europe.  The author discusses the concept of the just war, who could declare war, as well as how wars were declared.  He shows the evolution of the practice that led to the employment of heralds being the standard procedure of declaring war in western Europe during the fifteenth century (p.29).

Baumgartner devotes two chapters to the practice and theory of declaring war in the sixteenth century.  The author sees the sixteenth century as the key period of transformation in both the practice and theory of the act of declaring war.  He believes that the question of who had the authority to declare war was mostly settled.  The use of resident ambassadors had largely replaced the use of heralds in the declaration of war.  A written declaration of war was handed over by the resident ambassador to the enemy court.  As for theory, humanists wrote about and advocated the return of Roman practices dealing with just wars and the declaration of war.  Baumgartner shows in his discussion of theory that “there was a serious disconnect between what the humanists wrote and what the rulers did” (p.55).

The ideas and procedures involving the declaration of war were further refined during the seventeenth century.  Writers began to pay closer attention to the actual practices of the rulers of the age.  Baumgartner, himself, examines exactly how (if at all) wars — from the conflicts of the Thirty Years War to the Wars of Louis XIV — were declared during this century.  The author argues that it was agreed that only true sovereigns could declare war but there was no agreement on what format was needed for a declaration of war during this period.

In the eighteenth century, theorists began to regulate a new set of rules — the so-called law of nations — that outlined a more civilized way of declaring and conducting war.  However, as the author points out, rulers “were less convinced of its necessity, and a broadening gap developed during the century between what theory dictated and what monarchs actually did” (p.115).  The century began with a large number of formal declarations of war in the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) and the Great Northern War (1700-1721).  But, Frederick II of Prussia began of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) without a formal declaration of war.  The French and Indian War (1754-1763) broke out without a declaration of war between Britain and France.  Even so, the American War of Independence (1775-1783) saw formal declarations of war between Britain and France in 1778.

In his chapter on the Age of Revolutions, Baumgartner depicts historical and contemporary practices and theory that influenced the making of the United States’ constitution and the granting of power for formal declarations of war to the United States Congress in the late 1780s.  The writers of the constitution sought to limit the war-making power of the President.  The author also discusses how the National Assembly of France ordered King Louis XVI to formally declare war against Austria, beginning the War of the First Coalition (1792-1797).  Another example of the formal declaration of war was the United States Congress declaring war against Britain in the War of 1812 (1812-1815).  The author stresses that the Declaration of 1812 established the formal procedure for the United States’ declarations of war against Mexico in 1846, Spain in 1898, Germany in 1917, as well as Japan, Germany, and Italy in 1941.

Baumgartner provides a valuable overview of the theory and practice of declaring war, especially in western Europe, during the Early Modern era.  Theory and practice did not always coincide.  This valuable study contributes to the increasing number of studies that explore diplomatic issues in Early Modern and Modern Europe.  Other recent studies include M.S. Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450-1919 (1993), Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory, and Administration (1995), Linda S. Frey and Marsha L. Frey, The History of Diplomatic Immunity (1999), and Jeremy Black, A History of Diplomacy (2010).

Dr William Young
University of North Dakota
Grand Forks, North Dakota

Book Review of Marshal Vauban and the Defence of Louis XIV’s France

James Falkner. Marshal Vauban and the Defence of Louis XIV’s France. Barnsley, England: Pen and Sword Military, 2011. ISBN 978-1-84415-927-7. Maps. Illustrations. Appendices. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. viii, 226. $50.00.

Originally posted in Military History (4 January 2012)

James Falkner, a former British Army officer, has written a study concerning Sebastien Le Prestre, Marshal Vauban, and his contributions to fortress building and siege warfare during the reign of Louis XIV.  Falkner has previously provided us valuable studies on the Duke of Marlborough’s campaigns, battles, and sieges during the War of the Spanish Succession in Great and Glorious Days: The Duke of Marlborough’s Battles, 1704-1709 (2003), Blenheim 1704: Marlborough’s Greatest Victory (2004), Marlborough’s Wars: Eye Witness Accounts, 1702-1713 (2005), Ramillies 1706: Year of Miracles (2006), Marlborough’s Sieges (2007), and James Falkner’s Guide to Marlborough’s Battlefields (2008).  In this current study, the author examines the military career and role of Vauban in French military efforts in the later years of the Franco-Spanish War (1635-1659), War of Devolution (1667-1668), Dutch War (1672-1678/79), War of Reunions (1683-1684), Nine Years War (1688-1697), and early years of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713/14).

Falkner’s study examines both Vauban’s contribution to attack and defense in siege warfare.  Vauban was noted for his genius in the conduct of calculated offensive siege operations that included lines of circumvallation and contravallation as well as a systematic approach by the use of parallel trenches to capture enemy fortresses.  His system of siege warfare, not always adhered to by impatient French commanders, saved numerous men from the slaughter of massive assaults against well-defended positions.  Vauban’s experience grew from his first siege operation at Sainte-Menehould during the Fronde in 1652 and throughout the Wars of Louis XIV until his last effort at Alt-Breisach during the War of the Spanish Succession in 1703.  Vauban’s system would remain the standard method of attacking a fortress to the twentieth century.

Louis XIV expanded French territory, especially in northeastern France during the War of Devolution, Dutch War, and War of Reunions.  French borders, particularly in this region, were vulnerable to attacks.  As such, the Sun King sought to beef up his defense against enemy threats.  Falkner focuses on Vauban and his engineering efforts to assess and improve, or redesign and rebuild, as far as the French treasury would permit, a credible defense system for France.  As a result, Marshal Vauban built the two-line system of fortresses (from Dunkirk to Givet, and Gravelines to Stenay) to defend France in the northeast.  This system was known as the pré carré (the dueling field), or what our author calls the “Fence of Iron.”  The dual line of fortresses would save France from an allied invasion led by the Duke of Marlborough in the War of the Spanish Succession.  Falkner notes that these fortifications also played an important part in French military history for the next 250 years.

The author blends Vauban’s contributions to fortress building and siege operations with a general depiction of siege warfare in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.  This well-written study contains valuable appendices providing a chronological listing of Vauban’s siege operations; a list of more than 180 fortresses, citadels, towns, and forts under French control that the engineer designed, constructed, or improved during the reign of the Louis XIV; and a glossary of siege terms.  This work is highly recommend to anyone interested in Early Modern European Military History.  Falkner’s study is an outstanding addition to the available literature in English on Vauban and siege warfare, including Reginald Blomfield’s Sebastien Le Prestre de Vauban, 1633-1707 (1938), Christopher Duffy’s Fortress Warfare in the Age of Vauban and Frederick the Great, 1680-1789 (1985), F.J. Hebbert and George A. Rothrock’s Soldier of France: Sebastien Le Prestre de Vauban, 1633-1707 (1989), Paddy Griffith’s The Vauban Fortifications of France (2006), and Jean-Denis G.G. Lepage’s Vauban and the French Military under Louis XIV: An Illustrated History of Fortifications and Strategies (2009).  Vauban’s writings are also available in Rothrock’s translation of A Manual of Siegecraft and Fortification (1968).

Dr William Young
University of North Dakota
Grand Forks, North Dakota

Book Review of Cross and Crescent in the Balkans: The Ottoman Conquest of South-Eastern Europe (14th-15th Centuries)

David Nicolle. Cross and Crescent in the Balkans: The Ottoman Conquest of South-Eastern Europe (14th-15th Centuries). Barnsley, England: Pen and Sword Military, 2010. ISBN 978-1-84415-954-3. Maps. Chronology, Illustrations. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xvi, 256. $39.05.

Originally posted in Military History (18 August 2011)

Dr David Nicolle is the author of numerous books dealing with medieval European and Islamic warfare, including Constantinople 1453: The End of Byzantium (2000), Nicopolis 1396: The Last Crusade (2001), Crusader Warfare (2007), and Knights of Jerusalem: The Crusading Order of the Hospitallers 1100-1565 (2008).  He has been a prolific writer for the Osprey military history series.  In the present study, the author provides a narrative that examines the complex history of Southeast Europe and the rise of the Ottoman Empire.  Nicolle addresses the culture of the numerous groups of people in the region, including government and politics, economics, religion, law, literature, as well as military tactics and equipment.  His study focuses on the turbulent history of the Middle East and the gradual unifying effect of Ottoman military might over a fragmented Anatolia and Southeast Europe.

The main thrust of this study that will interest military historians is on the Ottoman conquest of Southeast Europe.  By the fourteenth century the Byzantine Empire was weak militarily.  The Byzantines needed the alliance of the Ottoman Turks in the struggle against Christian Balkan states.  In 1353-55, the Ottomans gained their first foothold on the European continent as an ally of the Byzantine Emperor.  The Turks manned the fort of Çinbi and neighboring towns on the Gallipoli peninsula.  As Nicolle writes: “This would thereafter be the launch-pad for the Ottoman state’s eventual conquest of the entire Balkan peninsula” (p.64).  In fact, the Byzantines soon turned to the Serbs and Bulgarians for assistance against the Ottoman Turks.  But, the Ottomans, under Emir Murat (Murad) I (1362-89), pushed deep into Thrace, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Serbia.  He became “one of the most remarkable conquerors in medieval European history” (p.66).  Having captured Adrianople in eastern Thrace, Murat I renamed it Edirne and established the capital of the Ottoman Empire there in 1365.  He conquered western Thrace and Macedonia in 1371-76, and then obtained the vassal states of Bulgaria in 1376 and Dobruja in 1388.  Murat I took the title of sultan in 1383.  He led the Ottoman forces that defeated the Serbs at the First Battle of Kosovo in 1389.

Bayezit (Bayezid) I (1389-1402) picked up where his father left off.  He forced Serbia and Bosnia to become vassals of the Ottoman Empire in 1389, followed by Wallachia in 1391.  The Ottomans had control of the southern Balkans, having reduced the Byzantine Empire to the area immediately surrounding Constantinople.  In 1393, the Turks captured Nikopol (Nicopolis) in Bulgaria.  At this point, in 1394, Pope Boniface IX, with encouragement from the threatened states of Hungary, Venice, and Genoa, declared a crusade against the Ottoman Turks.  The crusade would include ground and naval forces from France, Burgundy, Hungary, Knights of St. John, the German Empire, Italian city-states, Byzantine Empire, and various other Christian states.  The crusade ended at the Battle of Nikopol, where the Ottomans soundly defeated the Crusaders, in September 1396.  The author stresses that, “the best Crusading army that western Christendom could muster had been utterly defeated in its first real battle” (p.123).  As a result, the Kingdom of Hungary was gravely weakened in its defense against the Turkish threat.  Fortunately, Bayezit I turned his attention away from Europe to the danger of Timur-i Lenk (Tamerlane) on the Asian front.  Timur had already overrun large parts of Russia, Iran, India, and Central Asia.  In 1400, Timur moved his army into Anatolia and northern Syria, capturing Damascus in 1401, and then outmaneuvering and defeating Bayezit I at the Battle of Ankara in 1402.  The Sultan was captured (and died in captivity) while the shattered Ottoman army fled to the west.  Timur ravaged Turkish lands to the Aegean Sea, capturing Izmir in 1402.  Nicolle points out that “the defeat . . . could have spelled the end of the Ottoman state, but the fact that it did not do so says a great deal for the inherent strength of early Ottoman government and military systems” (p.136).  Fortunately, Timur turned towards the goal of conquering Chinese territory.

The Ottoman Sultanate remained in turmoil for a number of years.  The Ottoman Empire experienced a series of civil wars between the four sons of Bayezit I for control of the Sultanate.  As a result, Serbia, Bosnia, and Wallachia threw off Ottoman control.  Eventually, in 1413, Mehmet I (Mehmed) (1413-21) emerged as the leader of the Ottomans.  Ottoman power would rise under the leadership of Mehmet I, his son Murat II (1421-44, 1446-51), and his son Mehmet II (1444-46, 1451-81).  The Ottomans regained the lost Balkan provinces by 1524, and forced Dubrovnik (Ragusa) to become a vassal state in 1430, followed by conquering Epirus and southern Albania in 1431-33.  The growth of Ottoman power resulted in King Wladislaw (Wladyslaw) III of Poland-Hungary launching a crusade against the Turks in 1443.  However, Murat II defeated the Crusaders at the Battle of Varna in 1444.  “Once again,” so declares Nicolle, “a victory against the biggest and best-equipped army that Western Christendom could send against them brought huge prestige to the Ottomans” (p.153).  Now the Turks forced Morea to become a vassal state, and then imposed direct rule over Bulgaria in 1446.  Shortly thereafter, in 1448, Janos Hunyadi, the Regent-Governor of Hungary, led a Hungarian-Wallachian invasion of Ottoman territory.  This time the Turkish army under Murat II defeated the invaders at the Second Battle of Kosovo.  The Turks now dominated the Balkan Region.

The youthful Mehmet II sought to conquer the fragmented remnants of the Byzantine Empire.  The main goal was the city of Constantinople, technically a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire, ruled by Constantine XI Palaiologos (1449-53).  The author points out that in “purely military terms the Byzantine Empire was now a very minor player in the events of south-eastern Europe” (p.176).  But Constantinople was protected by massive walls, a small army and navy, and held the strategic island of Imroz off the mouth of the Dardanelles.  Even so, the Ottomans had the advantages of a larger naval fleet, massive siege guns, and a large army against the Byzantines and their allies in the siege of Constantinople in 1453.  The actual siege lasted for fifty-four days before the Turks overran the city.  “The impact of the fall of Constantinople on the Byzantine world,” Nicolle writes, “was of course catastrophic and sent shock waves across Orthodox Christendom . . .” (p.217).

Mehmet II “the Conqueror” next turned towards Wallachia, Moldavia, and Greece, taking control of most of the Balkans by 1460.  All that was left to resist Turkish power in the region were Venetian enclaves around Greece and the Balkans, Venetian and Genoese outposts in the Aegean and Adriatic Seas, as well as Genoese outposts in the Crimea.  The Aegean and Black Seas, however, would become Ottoman lakes in the late fifteenth century, and the Venetian Republic and its overseas empire would continue its struggle against the Ottoman Empire in the Eastern Mediterranean Region.  The Turks would raid into northeastern Italy in the late 1490s and soon be knocking on the door of the Kingdom of Hungary.

Nicolle’s Cross and Crescent in the Balkans: The Ottoman Conquest of South-Eastern Europe (14^th-15^th Centuries) is a good introduction to the early Ottoman Empire and the conquest of Southeast Europe.  It conveys the complex history of the region with its numerous fragmented states over several hundred years of history.  It is highly informative, but the author goes off track at times from the theme of the Ottoman’s conquest of Southeast Europe and the study almost becomes a general history of the region.  The book has a few typographical errors and mistakes, which the editor should have caught, resulting in frustration and confusion for the reader.  It also lacks notes citing the sources used.  Overall, however, this study is useful for general readers and undergraduate students.

Dr William Young
University of North Dakota
Grand Forks, North Dakota

Book Review of Henry VIII and Francis I: The Final Conflict, 1540-1547

David Potter. Henry VIII and Francis I: The Final Conflict, 1540-1547. History of Warfare series. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2011. ISBN 978-90-04-20431-7. Maps. Illustrations. Notes. Appendices. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xxix, 562. $243.00.

Originally posted in Military History (18 January 2012)

Dr David Potter, a Reader in History at the University of Kent, addresses the final war between Henry VIII of England (ruled 1509-1547) and Francis I of France (ruled 1515-1547) during the 1540s. The conflict was part of the later stages of the Italian Wars (1494-1559) or Habsburg-Valois Wars between the rulers of the Habsburg Holy Roman Empire and Spain against Valois France.

In the earlier conflicts, Henry VIII joined the Holy League alliance against Louis XII of France in 1511 in the War of the League of Cambrai (1508-1516). In 1513, Henry VIII personally led an invasion force into northeastern France in pursuit of glory and to expand English territory beyond the Pale of Calais. English and Imperial forces besieged Thérouanne, defeated a French relief force at the Battle of the Spurs (Guinegate), and then captured the town. The English king next besieged and took the city of Tournai in September 1513. England negotiated a separate peace with France in 1514, but kept Tournai for four more years. Then, in 1520, Henry VIII and Francis I met at the so-called Field of Cloth of Gold near Calais to increase their bond of friendship. This, however, did not last and French aggression led to England joining Charles V, the Holy Roman Emperor (ruled 1519-1556) and King of Spain (1516-1556), against France in the Italian War of 1521-1526. English forces marched out of Calais and attacked the French in Picardy, burning and looting the countryside along the way, in 1522. In 1523, a massive English army under the Charles Brandon, the Duke of Suffolk, marched against France. Suffolk crossed the Somme River, but was unwilling to attack Paris, and therefore retired to Calais. England and France agreed to a peace settlement in 1526.

In the ensuing conflict, the War of the League of Cognac (1526-1530), Henry VIII allied with France, the Papacy, Venice, Milan, and Florence against Charles V in April 1527. But, in the following month, the Imperial army under the command of the Duke of Bourbon sacked the city of Rome. Henry VIII was now in no position to oppose Charles V. His foreign policy was tied to obtaining an annulment of his marriage to Catherine of Aragon (Charles V’s aunt) from the Imperial prisoner Pope Clement VII. Despite agreeing to a French alliance in 1532, the English monarch refused to provide aid to Francis I and sought to stay out of the short-lived Franco-Imperial War of 1536-1538. The conflict did not resolve the long-standing issues between the Habsburgs and Valois. But, the peace settlement left Henry VIII out in the cold, and he realized that England would have to take a side in the next conflict.

Potter calls the subject of his study, the final conflict, “the most serious and destructive war between England and France in the reigns of Henry VIII and Francis I (p.1).” In July 1542, Francis I, allied with Suleiman the Magnificent of the Ottoman Empire, declared war (the Italian War of 1542-1546) on the Holy Roman Empire. Henry VIII had tried to keep some diplomatic leverage with both Charles V and Francis I in the late 1530s and early 1540s. He prepared for the eventuality of war, using the significant boost in finances provided by the dissolution and sale of monasteries in England, by embarking on a serious program of refortification and shipbuilding. By 1542 relations between England and France were collapsing over French aid to Scotland. Henry VIII and Charles V overcame diplomatic issues and created an alliance in February 1543, with England expected to fight the auld alliance of France and Scotland. England declared war against France four months later. In December, Henry VIII and Charles V agreed to lead their armies in person in an offensive against France.

Henry VIII assembled an army of about 40,000 men at Calais, and the English forces moved slowly into France in June 1544. The English army was divided into two parts. The first part, commanded by Thomas Howard, the Duke of Norfolk, besieged Montreuil on the Canche River. Charles Brandon, the Duke of Suffolk, leading the other part of the English army began the siege of the port city of Boulogne. Charles V insisted that the English forget these sieges and march on Paris. Henry VIII refused to consider such operations until the fall of Montreuil and Boulogne. Then, in September 1544, the English, with Henry VIII in command, captured Boulogne. However, at this point, the Emperor, who was running short on finances and needing to deal with religious unrest in the Empire, signed a separate peace with France in the Treaty of Crépy. The war between England and France continued, but the English monarch left for England. Norfolk soon abandoned the siege of Montreuil and retreated to Boulogne as a large French army advanced into the region. Suffolk and Norfolk then withdrew the majority of English forces to Calais, leaving about 4,000 men to defend Boulogne against a French siege.

Peace negotiations began and quickly broke down. As a result, the French king opted for an invasion of England. Francis I assembled a large number of troops and ships in Normandy. In May 1545, a small expeditionary force sailed and landed in Scotland to aid the Scots in the Anglo-Scottish War of the Rough Wooing (1543-1550). Then, in July, the French fleet sailed and conducted small-scale raids on the Isle of Wight, and later at Seaford in Sussex. These operations failed to achieve success, so the French fleet redeployed and set up a blockade of Boulogne. By September 1545 the conflict was at a stalemate, both sides running low on men and money. Henry VIII and Francis I continued their peace talks, but the English monarch refused to give up Boulogne. The war finally ended with the Admirals’ Peace (Treaty of Ardres-Guînes) in June 1546. Boulogne would remain in English hands until the Treaty of Boulogne (1550). Both Henry VIII and Francis I would die in 1547, leaving new participants to fight with or against Charles V in the last of the Habsburg-Valois Wars, the Italian War of 1551-1559.

Potter has previously provided us important works in French politics and warfare including War and Government in the French Provinces: Picardy, 1470-1560 (1993), A History of France, 1460-1560: The Emergence of a Nation State (1995), and Renaissance France at War: Armies, Culture and Society, c.1480-1560 (2008). In the present study, the author discusses the international situation and diplomacy that resulted in a rapprochement and alliance between Henry VIII and Charles V in the late 1530s and early 1540s. He focuses on diplomacy and military operations throughout the conflict, providing a thorough discussion of Henry VIII’s military campaigns in northeastern France, the Anglo-French search for mercenaries, war at sea, the significant cost of the war, and peace negotiations. This outstanding study, based on archival research, is the first of three volumes that our author plans to write on Anglo-French conflicts from the last years of Henry VIII to the early reign of Elizabeth I. It is very expensive at $243, and hopefully the next two studies will not cost an arm and a leg.

Dr William Young
University of North Dakota
Grand Forks, North Dakota